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Agreements
Consumer information is exchanged more frequently with each passing
day. Indeed, the number of electronic payments in the United States in 2009
totaled 84.5 billion, representing a 31% increase since 20o6.' Whether
consumers purchase clothing online or swipe their Visa cards after dinner,
personal information moves constantly through the electronic channels of
commerce. As consumers expect to purchase goods more easily in this
electronic economy, they also rely increasingly on businesses to protect their
personal information.
Businesses protect consumer information by installing encryption and data
security software. Recently, one state even mandated that businesses take
specific and complex preventive measures to help ensure that security breaches
do not occur.' As many companies are now required to use data security
1. See FED. RESERVE SYs., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2oo6-2oo9, at 22 tbl. 4 .2 (2011), available at http://www.
frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/201o payments-study.pdf.
2. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY-DECEMBER
2009, at 3 (20o0), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-reports/
sentinel-cy2009.pdf (noting that the Consumer Sentinel Network "received over 1.3 million
complaints during calendar year 2oo9: 54% fraud complaints; 21% identity theft complaints;
and 25% other types of complaints").
3. See Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the
Commonwealth, 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2011) [hereinafter Massachusetts Privacy
Regulation]. The Massachusetts regulation requires all companies that "own or license
personal information about a resident" to provide "security and confidentiality" for this
information. Id. at 17.01. Specifically, the new Massachusetts regulation requires companies
to implement a "written, comprehensive information security program" and encrypt all
personal information stored on portable devices and all personal information that is
transmitted wirelessly or over public networks. Id. at 17.04.
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software, software vendors find themselves in increasingly strong bargaining
positions when negotiating software licensing agreements.' Further, the highly
specialized nature of this software and the consolidation within the software
security industry mean that fewer vendors provide these products, and
businesses in need of this software face increasingly asymmetrical
negotiations.s Certain companies, including smaller businesses, face the most
pressure because they have fewer options for recourse if a fair licensing
agreement is not reached. 6
Some critics also argue that this level of industry consolidation has led to a
decline in the quality of products offered by some software vendors.7 Despite
the fact that some software companies are arguably providing a lower quality
good, the bargaining power created by consolidation in the industry-
combined with the fact that many businesses are statutorily required to use
4. See Steven P. Mandell & Stephen J. Rosenfeld, Drafting Software Licenses for Litigation, in
UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 2009, at 741, 746 (PLI Intellectual
Prop. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 19149, 2009).
5. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 314-15 (20o6) (describing the theory that suppliers have
little incentive to "add high levels of security because the buyer has no low-cost method for
ascertaining quality"); Security Software Market To Grow 8% in 2009, HELP NET SECURITY
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=8137 ("The security
software market in 2008 was characterised by a high level of consolidation with the
examples of Mc Afee [sic] purchasing Secure Computing, Symantec and Sophos acquiring
MessageLabs and Ultimaco, respectively. This is a sector where further consolidation is
expected in the near future." (quoting Ruggero Contu, Principal Research Analyst, Gartner,
Inc.)). The consolidation in this market can be seen by the fact that the top two business
security software vendors, Symantec and McAfee, maintain almost half of the market share.
See Higher McAfee Share in Business Security Software, THESTREET (Aug. 27, 2010, 3:44 PM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/1o846552/higher-mcafee-share-in-business-security
-software.html (noting that McAfee maintained about 17% market share in business security
software as of 2010); Trefis Team, Sophisticated Cyber Attacks Expand the Addressable Security
Software Market, NASDAQ (Mar. 2, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://community.nasdaq.com/
News/2o10-o3/sophisticated-cyber-attacks-expand-the-addressable-security-software-market
.aspx?storyid=60129 (noting that Symantec is the market leader with roughly 29% of the
business security software market). Other major business security software vendors,
including Trend Micro, IBM, and EMC, maintain substantial market shares as well. See
Ellen Messmer, Intel Steps in to Security Software Market with McAfee Deal,
COMPUTERWORLDUK (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.computerworlduk.com/in-depth/
security/3236326/intel-steps-in-to-security-software-market-with-mcafee-deal ("Led by
Symantec, McAfee, Trend Micro, IBM and EMC, total industry sales are projected to hit at
least $16.5 billion this year. .. .").
6. See Nim Razook, Legal Issues Facing Corporations, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643, 655 (2003).
7. Larry Walsh, Analysis: Security Industry Consolidation, CSO ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2007),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/221303/analysis-security-industry-consolidation ("Longtime
customers and partners have complained bitterly about the decline in quality. . . .").
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data security software -allows these companies to disclaim practically all
liability stemming from a security breach, even where the software fails.'
Moreover, as businesses acquire and transmit more consumer information,
the potential liabilities associated with a security breach increase. Indeed,
several of the worst data security breaches have occurred in recent years. 9 One
example involved TJX Companies, a clothing retailer. In 2007, TJX suffered a
breach and lost roughly 45.7 million credit card numbers.'o By 2008, the cost of
this security breach was estimated at $216 million, and this figure was expected
to climb because of pending litigation, including a class-action lawsuit."
Although the number of people affected and the frequency of security
breaches are troubling, this Comment focuses on a company's potential
liability after a breach. In doing so, however, it offers a solution that provides
software vendors with strong incentives to manufacture more secure products.
When businesses lose information because of a security breach, they face
massive costs, as illustrated by the TJX breach. Recently, many states have
increased these costs by passing more complex and expensive reporting
requirements. These disclosure statutes shift greater costs from consumers to
the businesses that hold their information should a breach occur. While these
changes affect the relationship between consumers and businesses, software
licensing agreements between vendors and businesses remain unchanged. In
short, these agreements continue to restrict vendors' liabilities, allowing them
to avoid these new burdens. The ability of vendors to avoid these liabilities is
8. See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally
Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 427 (20o8) ("Yet, software vendors have traditionally refused to
take responsibility for the security of their software, and have used various risk allocation
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to shift the risk of insecure software
to the licensee.").
9. Mandell & Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 745; see also David Hakala, The Worst IT Security
Breaches of 2007, IT SECURITY (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.itsecurity.com/features/top
-security-breaches-2007-0122o8 (noting that both private companies, such as TD
Ameritrade and Gap, Inc., and public entities, such as the Texas Commission on Law
Enforcement Standards and Education and the College of Southern Nevada, have recently
suffered data security breaches).
10. See Dawn Kawamoto, TJX Says 45.7 Million Customer Records Were Compromised, CNET
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2007, 9:28 AM), http://news.cnet.com/TJX-says-45.7-million-customer
-records-were-compromised/21oo-1o29_3-6171671.html.
n1. See Hakala, supra note 9.
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especially troubling considering that in 2olo more than a quarter of security
breaches were due to a system failure."
To address this situation, this Comment argues that courts should adopt a
fairer remedy under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) by holding
unreasonable limitations on liability unenforceable when contractual remedies
frustrate the essential purposes of the contract. This remedy will allow
businesses to spread costs more efficiently, will give the proper incentives to
software vendors," and will allow the UCC to achieve its goal of allowing
expectation damages in the case of a breach. This solution is a measured
response to the current imbalance in the data security licensing industry
because it would only invalidate licensing agreement provisions that frustrate
the essential purpose of the contract.
Part I provides a brief background on how Article II of the UCC affects
software licensing agreements. Part II then introduces the recent state statutory
developments in data security and demonstrates why these new reporting
requirements justify shifting additional liability back to software vendors. Part
III builds on Part II and argues that courts should stop enforcing a licensor's
limitations on liability when they frustrate the agreement's essential purpose,
except in cases where the fault causing the breach lies with the software user.' 4
I. SOFTWARE LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE UCC
A. Applying Article II to Data Security Licensing Agreements
Whether Article II even applied to the sale of software was a hotly debated
issue just fifteen years ago." This initial question is critical because Article II
covers only transactions that involve a sale of goods. 6 "Goods" are defined as
12. PONEMON INST., 2010 ANNUAL STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH 25 (2011), available at
http://www.cenzic.conVdownloads/Ponemon DataBreach_201103.pdf (finding "system failures"
account for 27% of all breaches).
13. By placing potential liability on software vendors when their products fail and cause a
breach, this remedy can be expected to protect consumers' information more effectively by
giving vendors strong economic incentives to make more secure products.
14. This Comment does not advocate shifting liability should the breach occur because of user
error. This shifting should only apply when there is a software failure caused by the
software vendor's error.
is. See Amelia H. Boss & William J. Woodward, Scope ofthe Uniform Commercial Code; Survey of
Computer Contracting Cases, 43 Bus. LAw. 1513, 1514-15 (1988).
16. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2003) ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to
transactions in goods . . . .").
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"all things [including specially manufactured goods] that are movable at the
time of identification to a contract for sale."" This definition distinguishes
goods from services that lie beyond Article II's scope.'8
Software is a hybrid good because it involves certain services that
accompany the tangible product. 9 To determine whether software qualifies as
a good or service, most courts evaluate the contract's "predominant purpose."o
This test asks which part of the contract is paramount -the goods sold or the
services rendered."' The second test, used by a minority of courts, is known as
the "gravamen of the action" test." Under the "gravamen" test, courts
determine whether the source of the complaint regards the goods or the
services section of the contract." Even with these two tests, determining the
contract's "predominant purpose" or the "gravamen of the action" can be
complex because of these interrelated features. Despite this complexity, courts
generally view software licensing agreements as contracts for "goods" and
review their terms under Article II.
B. Limiting Liability and Remedies Under Article II
Software licensors attempt to limit their liability by using provisions of the
UCC, such as warranty disclaimers, limitations of liability, and limitations on
17. Id. § 2-10 3 (1)(k).
is. Whether Article II applies to software transactions has been discussed widely. See, e.g.,
David A. Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer
Contracts, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 277, 278 & n.9 (1987).
ig. See id. at 277-82.
2o. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (articulating the predominant
purpose test).
21. See Nat'l Historic Shrines Found., Inc. v. Dali, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967).
22. LYNN M. LoPUCKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMs APPROACH 12 (4th ed.
2009).
23. Id. Under the gravamen of the action test, "[i]f the problem lies with the services, then
Article 2 does not apply to the dispute even if the predominant purpose of the transaction is
goods rather than services." Id.
24. See, e.g., Dealer Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Design Auto. Grp., Inc., 822 N.E.2d 556, 50 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005) ("A sampling of decisions from various jurisdictions shows that courts have
generally recognized that computer software qualifies as a 'good' for purposes of the
UCC.").
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remedies.2 ' Licensors can disclaim these liabilities and warranties under the
UCC because Article II allows parties to depart from the Code's default rules if
they agree." Simply put, the UCC promotes freedom of contract, and only a
few provisions cannot be altered by agreement. 7
Courts generally enforce the restrictive language inserted by software
vendors in an effort to limit virtually all of their potential liabilities." For
example, in disclaiming the various warranties provided for in the UCC, many
provisions inserted by vendors include disclaimers for: (1) "all implied
warranties (e.g., merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose)";
(2) "any express warranties except as otherwise stated in the agreement"; and
(3) "in those states that have adopted the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA), the warranties implied through UCITA.""
Further, in limiting liabilities and remedies, vendors insist on including
provisions that specify the licensee's remedies (if any) -including time frame
and mechanism for providing notice of election of remedies - and that state
that the remedies in the contract provide the "sole and exclusive" means of
25. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a) (2003) (implied warranty of title); id. 5 2-313 (express warranties);
id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose).
26. See U.C.C. 5 1-301(a) (2001); see also Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The Commercial
Irrelevancy of the "Battle of the Forms," 49 Bus. LAw. 1019, 1022 (1994) (discussing how
gap-filler provisions only apply in the absence of contract disclaimers and terms negotiated
by the parties).
27. See U.C.C. § 1-3 02(b) ("The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care ...
may not be disclaimed by agreement.").
28. See, e.g., U.S. Achievement Acad., LLC v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400 (E.D.
Ky. 2006) (finding no unconscionability between "seasoned business entity" and software
supplier); Bray Int'l, Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., No. CIV H-02-o098, 2005 WL
3371875, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2005) (finding that Texas law provided no bad faith
exception to enforcement of limitation of liability clause); Peerless Wall & Window
Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that
the license agreement limited duration of any warranty to ninety days and stating that
"[t]here is nothing legally objectionable about such a temporal limitation"); Markborough
Cal., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 227 Cal. App. 3d 705, 714-15 (1991) (holding that contractual
limitation of liability clauses have long been recognized as valid).
29. See Mandell & Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 751; see also AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Coherent
Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 1978) ("By limiting the warranties available and the
remedies under the warranties, parties are able to provide a consensual allocation of risk in
accordance with sound business practices.").
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redress.3o Vendors also sometimes require that businesses send back the
defective software before receiving a refund."
While vendors employ the UCC to disclaim many of these warranties and
to limit their liabilities and remedies, businesses have attempted to recover
some of the losses stemming from software vendors after security breaches."
Various theories used in these cases include unconscionability," tort doctrines
such as negligent misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement,3 4 and the failure
of essential purpose doctrine." These theories usually do not prevail, except for
the failure of essential purpose doctrine, which a few courts have adopted."6
This doctrine renders liability limitations unenforceable if the remedy
provisions frustrate the contract's essential purpose."
Despite the limited acceptance of the failure of essential purpose doctrine,
most courts continue to enforce these warranty and liability limitations in a
manner that forces virtually all security breach costs and liabilities onto the
businesses that use the software to protect consumers. Over the past few years,
this asymmetrical situation has become more uneven as state legislatures have
placed more complex notification and disclosure requirements on businesses
should a breach occur. These added costs provide another justification for
courts to use the failure of essential purpose doctrine to shift some potential
liabilities back onto software vendors. Before Part III argues for that solution,
Part II introduces the new requirements and costs recently placed on
businesses by various state statutes.
30. Mandell & Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 751.
31. Id. at 755.
32. See, e.g., U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 1975)
(concerning an unsuccessful claim by a business to recover on the basis of the contract's
unconscionability).
33. See, e.g., Hunter v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 303-04 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a seller's ability to limit liability for breach of express warranties to repair or replace was
not unconscionable).
34. See, e.g., Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, lo6s
(8th Cir. 2005) (dismissing claim for negligent misrepresentation against software
developer); see Scott, supra note 8, at 441-42; see also U.C.C. § 2-721 (2003) ("Remedies for
material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this Article for
non-fraudulent breach.").
3S. See U.C.C. 5 2-719(2).
36. See, e.g., Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243, 247-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
37. See, e.g., R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985);
Goddard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 396 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio 1979).
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II. NEW AND EVOLVING STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS INCREASE
LIABILITIES AND COSTS FOR BUSINESSES
A. Understanding the Myriad of State Reporting Requirements
Currently, forty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted breach
notification statutes." These security breach statutes outline disclosure
requirements for companies that lose consumer information during a security
breach. After a breach occurs, companies must first decide whether the
"breach" triggers the statutory requirements. The vast majority of these
statutes define "breach" broadly, so this is a simple determination. 9 For
example, Texas and California define "breach" as the "unauthorized acquisition
of computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or
integrity of personal information." 4o
Once a company determines that a breach has occurred, it must conclude
whether "personal information" was lost. The loss of "personal information" is
the critical factor that triggers disclosure under the various state statutes, but
states define "personal information" differently. Generally, "personal
information" is defined as (a) a person's first and last name or (b) first initial
and last name, in combination with at least one of the following: (i) Social
Security number; (ii) driver's license or state ID number; (iii) bank account,
credit card, or debit card number, along with security or access codes or
passwords;4 ' (iv) medical information;42 (v) health insurance information;43 or
(vi) certain biometric information."
38. See John B. Kennedy et al., U.S. State and Selected Federal Privacy and Data Security
Developments 2on1: On the Threshold of a Federal Law?, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAw 165, 173 (PLI Privacy & Data Sec. Law Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 28713, 2011).
39. John B. Kennedy, U.S. Information Security Law Update 2oo9: The Patchwork Quilt of
Regulations Continues To Grow, in TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY AND DATA
SECURITY LAw 115, 125 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 19129,
2009).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2009); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE § 521.053 (Vernon 2009).
41. The majority ofjurisdictions only include (i), (ii), and (iii) as elements in defining "personal
information." See Kennedy et al., supra note 38, exhibit A, at 235.
42. Arkansas and California include medical information. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4 -110-103(7)(D)
(Supp. 2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e)(4).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e) (5).
44. Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin include certain biometric data. IOWA CODE
ANN. 5715C.1(11)(e) (West Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-8o2(5)(e) (2008); N.C. GEN.
STAT. 5 75-66(c)(1o) (2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 13 4 -9 8(1)(b)(5) (West 2009).
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Finally, businesses must determine which state law applies. State
legislatures draft security breach statutes to protect their residents. Thus, if a
company loses information about consumers from twenty different states, the
required level of disclosure differs based on where those individuals are
domiciled. Because it can be prohibitively expensive to determine each
individual's domicile, companies may have to comply with the most stringent
disclosure laws to avoid liability.4s
Recently, Massachusetts imposed even greater costs on businesses in an
effort to prevent breaches."* These new regulations require every company
"that owns or licenses personal information about a resident" to provide
reasonable security for this information.47 Specifically, the new Massachusetts
regulation requires such companies to implement a "written, comprehensive
information security program" and to encrypt all personal information stored
on portable devices and all personal information that is transmitted wirelessly
or over public networks.4' These regulations took effect in 2010.49 As most
companies store at least a few Massachusetts residents' personal information,
these regulations likely will become the norm.s0 Because companies face these
greater burdens in the event of a software breach, they ought to be able to shift
some liability back to software vendors.
B. Calculating the Costs of These New and Complex Regulations
The costs of these disclosure requirements vary based on the characteristics
of the company, the data lost, and the state statute implicated by the breach.
45. Many states include safe harbor provisions in these data security statutes, which provide
that a company is deemed in compliance if it follows its own breach notification procedure
or adheres to more stringent state or federal regulations, as long as it is consistent with the
timing requirements in the statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, S 12B-10 3 (West 2005);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7ao2 (2006); see also Kennedy et al., supra note 38, exhibit A, at 235
(summarizing the safe harbor provisions in the various state statutes).
46. Massachusetts Privacy Regulation, supra note 3, at 17.01 (noting that the purpose behind the
new Massachusetts regulation is to "insure the security and confidentiality of customer
information in a manner fully consistent with industry standards; protect against
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such information; and protect
against unauthorized access to or use of such information that may result in substantial
harm or inconvenience to any consumer").
47. Id. at 17.04. Section 17.02 defines "owns or licenses" to mean "receives, stores, maintains,
processes, or otherwise has access to personal information." Id. at 17.02.
48. Id. at 17.04.
4g. Id. at 17.05.
so. See sources cited supra note 45.
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Despite these variations, reports estimate that these new regulations alone will
cost $15 per customer should a breach occur." When a company holds millions
of consumer records (and loses between 46 million and 215 million individuals'
information, as in the case of TJX Companiess2), these costs compound
quickly. Also, when the total costs associated with a breach are viewed, costs
can climb to over $200 per record." Between these direct costs, new disclosure
requirements, and general reputational costs, companies face greater expenses
than they did just five years ago should a breach occur. 4 Courts, however,
continue to enforce extremely restrictive limitations on liabilities and remedies
inserted by vendors into software licensing agreements.ss Part III argues that
courts should spread these new costs more fairly across businesses as well as
software vendors.
III. TOWARD A FAIRER REMEDY FOR BUSINESSES
As noted above, a few courts refuse to enforce certain licensing agreements
when the contractual remedies are so limited that they frustrate the contract's
essential purpose. 6 Simply put, if an agreement provides no meaningful
possibility of recovery, some courts will look beyond the contract's four corners
to provide an adequate remedy under the failure of essential purpose
51. Amy O'Connor, Security Breach Notification Laws Reinforce Need for Cyber Insurance, INS. J.,
Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2olo/03/04/107853.htm.
52. See Kawamoto, supra note lo.
53. See PONEMON INST., supra note 12, at 5 ("The average organizational cost of a data breach
this year increased to $7.2 million, up 7 percent from $6.8 million in 2oo9. Total breach
costs have grown every year since 20o6. Data breaches in 2010 cost their companies an
average of $214 per compromised record, up $1o (5 percent) from last year."). The costs
associated with security breaches include: lost business, ex-post response, notification, and
detection/escalation. Id. at 18-19.
S4. While the new notification requirements increase the costs associated with a breach, costs
also are greater today than they were just a few years ago because companies hold more
consumer information due to the increase in electronic transactions. See supra note I.
ss. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d io81, 1087 ( 3d Cir. 1980)
("In short, there is nothing in the formation of the contract or the circumstances resulting in
failure of performance that makes it unconscionable to enforce the parties' allocation of risk.
We conclude, therefore, that the provision of the agreement excluding consequential
damages should be enforced, and the district court erred in making an award for such
losses."); see also supra note 28 (noting other representative cases).
s6. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2003) ("Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.").
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doctrine.17 This minority rule-which has been articulated by the Eighth
Circuit -allows the failure of essential purpose doctrine to affect limitations of
liability as well." A Missouri state court provided a succinct summary of this
principle: "Since . . . the limitation of remedy has failed of its essential purpose
. . . all other contractual remedies are available . . . . Other remedies available
include the buyer's incidental and consequential damages resulting from the
breach . .. .""
If courts followed this minority position and gave the failure of essential
purpose doctrine more equitable bite in the software security context, they
would essentially create a mandatory rule (similar to unconscionability) that
software vendors could not frustrate a licensing contract's essential purpose.
This kind of mandatory rule appears necessary in this context -as opposed to
the current default rule framework- because of the parties' asymmetrical
bargaining positions, caused by the recent statutory burdens placed on
businesses as well as the small amount of competition in the industry. o
Further, the fact that consumer privacy is compromised when this type of
software fails to function properly provides an additional public policy reason
for not allowing vendors to escape liability simply because of their strong
bargaining position.
Currently, however, most jurisdictions do not give the failure of essential
purpose doctrine this amount of equitable bite. The majority position holds
that liability limitation clauses are independent of the limitations on
remedies." Under the majority's framework, a limitation of liability clause will
survive even if the remedy limitation is unenforceable. The justification behind
the majority rule is that "an exclusion of consequential damages stands unless
it is unconscionable, and unconscionability is determined by a court as a matter
57. See, e.g., R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985);
Goddard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 396 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio 1979).
58. R.W. Murray, Co., 758 F.2d at 266; Goddard, 396 N.E.2d at 761.
59. Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243, 247-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
60. See supra note 5.
61. This type of public policy justification can also be seen in cases where automobiles were
defective and put consumers in physical danger. See, e.g., Hibbs v. Jeep Corp., 666 S.W.2d
792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Goddard, 396 N.E.2d 761; Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226
N.W.2d 157 (S.D. 1975). For a general discussion of the failure of essential purpose doctrine,
see Howard Foss, When To Apply the Doctrine of Failure ofEssential Purpose to an Exclusion of
Consequential Damages: An Objective Approach, 25 Duo. L. REv. 551 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d io8l, 1o86 (3 d Cir. 1980).
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of law."6' However, as legislatures shift greater liabilities to businesses that
hold consumer information in an effort to protect those consumers, courts
should refuse to enforce restrictions on limitations of liability when contractual
remedies frustrate the essential purpose of software licensing agreements.
Allowing businesses and retailers to shift some costs and liabilities back to
vendors under the failure of essential purpose doctrine is desirable for several
reasons. First, this solution gives each party the proper incentives. Shifting the
possibility of increased liability back to vendors will better incentivize software
providers to design products that fail a smaller percentage of the time-
providing better protection for consumers.' This incentive is especially
important because more than one-quarter of security breaches occur because of
a software malfunction. 6' And where a breach is caused by a software defect,
the software vendor is the least cost avoider. From an economic standpoint,
putting some liability and burden on the least cost avoider is only prudent. If
the UCC continues to be used as a tool for vendors to disclaim all liabilities and
remedies, then software providers have little reason to remain scrupulous in
maintaining quality.
Second, shifting some liabilities back to vendors promotes more efficient
outcomes. While it is likely that adopting the minority position would cause
software vendors to slightly increase the price of their security software to
account for the increased potential liabilities, all companies that purchase the
software would shoulder this slightly increased price. Instead of a situation
where one company faces all liabilities posed by a security breach and has little
control over the quality of the security software it uses, this Comment's
proposal would force businesses and vendors alike to share in the risk of
breach. By sharing in the risk of breach, software vendors also will be
incentivized to make more secure products; 66 accordingly, any increased price
could be viewed as companies paying for a better product.
Third, software vendors are in the best position to internalize the risks that
are inherent in potential security breaches. As many businesses and retailers
lack sufficient assets to offset the liabilities of a potential breach, they have little
incentive to take on additional security measures should a breach occur.
Indeed, many of these companies would have to file for bankruptcy if all of the
liabilities from a security breach fell on them, and thus, their creditors in
63. Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Ind.
2001).
64. See supra note 13.
65. PONEMON INST., supra note 12, at 6.
66. See supra note 13.
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bankruptcy would bear the costs and the risks of breach. By placing some of
the potential costs of a breach on the software vendor, which is generally a
larger entity than the individual businesses that purchase security software,
courts could place some liabilities on the party that is in the best position to
internalize these risks and insure against them.'"
Finally, this Comment's proposal allows courts to effectuate the UCC's
broader goals.6 8 As the UCC generally provides expectation damages -putting
"the aggrieved party . . . in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed"-courts should find severe limitations on liability unenforceable. 69
This aspect of the UCC has been critical in minimizing contractors' costs. 70
While some might advocate amending the UCC, such a change likely would be
too broad. Under this Comment's proposal, courts could invalidate limitations
only when agreements restricted remedies in a way that frustrated their
purpose. Moreover, courts could distinguish between breaches caused by
software malfunctions and those caused by other factors, while an amendment
to the UCC could not account for these nuances as easily. Finally, as the UCC
provides broad rules to govern multiple industries, an amendment that carved
out a narrow exception targeted solely at data security software would not be
consistent with the UCC's overall framework.
67. As software vendors tend to be larger businesses, see supra notes 5-7, they are also in a better
position to handle this increased risk and in a better position to self-insure against it,
especially compared to many smaller businesses affected by these state statutory schemes. It
should be noted that this justification for placing additional burdens on software vendors
implies also that this Comment's solution may create additional barriers to entry in the
software licensing market. As noted above, however, the industry has already faced great
consolidation, and high barriers to entry already exist. See id. The actual effect, therefore, of
placing greater potential liabilities on software vendors vis-i-vis market entry should be
minimal. Moreover, shifting some liability to vendors would place a higher cost on
incumbent vendors compared to upstart vendors. Whereas larger, established vendors are
likely able to pay the liabilities from a security breach at one hundred cents on the dollar,
many upstart vendors may be forced into bankruptcy after a breach and thus cannot pay
their liabilities at one hundred cents on the dollar. See, e.g., Stefan Topfer, A Wake Up Call
for Small Business Data Security, NASDAQ (May 12, 2001, 12:21 PM), http://community
.nasdaq.com/News/20 1 -os/a-wake-up-call-for-small-business-data-security.aspx?storyid
=75654 ("The statistics show that 93% of businesses that suffer data loss for more than ten
days go bankrupt within the next year."). Accordingly, shifting some liability to vendors
places a greater burden on larger established vendors compared to smaller upstart vendors.
68. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Rethinking Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and
Contract: Toward a Unified Body ofLaw, 82 IOWAL. REv. 1137, 1155-58 (1997).
69. Id. at 1155 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-lo6 (1996)).
70. Id. at 1158.
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CONCLUSION
Compared to many other contracts, software licensing agreements greatly
favor vendors because businesses that hold consumer information are
practically required to implement these technologies. Concerns related to the
one-sided nature of these contracts have only recently come to the business
community's attention.
As state legislatures have enacted a panoply of statutes to protect
consumers, the reporting costs and added liabilities imposed on companies
have increased dramatically. The current situation squeezes businesses that
hold consumer information because they now experience more regulation,
while continuing to face licensing agreements that remove the possibility of
meaningful relief.
To address this risk shift, courts should adopt the minority position
regarding the failure of essential purpose doctrine when reviewing software
licensing agreements. This solution would allow courts to use the doctrine to
render limitations of liability unenforceable if the remedy provisions frustrate
the contract's essential purpose. This proposal also represents a measured
response and would more efficiently allocate the risk of loss, provide greater
incentives for vendors to manufacture more secure software, better spread
liability in the case of breach, and more completely accomplish the UCC's
overarching remedial goals.
STFPHEN S. GILSTRAP
1284
121:1271 2012
